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Abstract 
In periods of economic recession and budget constraints, it becomes essential for 
the governments to understand which tax revenues are more likely to guarantee a 
stable or increasing amount of revenues able to support the provision of main public 
services without depending too much on variation in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
The aim of this paper is to analyze a particular source of tax revenues in Italy, namely 
gambling tax revenue split by game type (i.e. Lotto; Lotteries; Entertainment 
machines), in order to understand how tax bases react to changes in income, providing 
a measure of short run (variability over the business cycle) and long run (growth) 
income elasticity of different gambling tax revenues. Results show that gambling 
activities tend to be impressively reactive to variation in income in the long run, and, 
on the contrary, not particularly volatile in the short run.  
 
Keywords: dynamic ordinary least squares, error correction models, excise 
taxation, gambling tax revenue, income elasticity of tax base. 
JEL Classification: H21, H27, H60, C10 
 
1. Introduction 
Most of western countries are facing dramatic economic problems, mainly caused 
by the economic recession of current years which has seriously reduced the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth levels and increased unemployment and poverty. This 
fact is rising the efforts of governments to find out additional financial resources to 
cope with the increasing social costs of economic crisis (e.g. subsidies to workers and 
firms) and to guarantee the provision of necessary services (e.g. education, health 
care).  
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In addition to this phenomenon, in Europe, countries belonging to the Economic 
and  Monetary Union (EMU) are subjected to strict budget constraints  imposed by the 
Stability and Growth Pact2 (SGP) which limits the decision possibilities for governments 
in the field of fiscal policies, reducing the opportunities of resorting to public debt and 
fiscal deficit as means of financing. 
In addition to these two phenomena, several European countries are already 
subjected to high level of fiscal pressure especially on income and general 
consumption; this fact makes impracticable a further increase in tax rates. Therefore, 
governments are trying to find additional financial resources from taxes other than 
income and sales ones. Among alternative sources of tax revenues, sin taxes (i.e. taxes 
levied on socially proscribed goods and services, as  alcohol, tobacco, candies, soft 
drinks, fast foods, gambling) are looked with interest by governments as they are 
usually perceived by the population as "voluntary taxes" due to the fact that they 
weight only on consumers of sin goods and thus they are more acceptable than taxes 
on widely consumed goods (Fox, 2010; Clotfelter and Cook, 1991). 
In the macro-economic environment, Italy does not make exception, recording 
impressively low GDP growth level, high level of public debt (almost 130% of GDP in 
2012)  and dramatically high fiscal pressure (in 2012 fiscal pressure in Italy accounted 
to 55% for each euro). As a consequence, like others European countries, Italian 
government started to look for alternative tax revenues and it identified gambling as a 
possible precious source of resources.  
As a result, during the last ten years (2003-2013), Italy experienced a big 
promotion of gambling activities by means of the government who has the monopoly 
of the sector. Generally, the strategy of the government was to increase gambling 
possibilities through the introduction of new types of games subjected to low tax rates 
in order to boost demand for gambling and to rise tax revenues.  
Before 2003, the number of legalized games in Italy was still limited3: in addition to 
the 4 casinos present in Italy (i.e. Venice,Sanremo,Campione d'Italia , Saint-Vincent) 
popular games included Lotto, a limited number of lotteries, Sport Betting, 
Superenalotto and Bingo. However, in 2003, Law 269/2003 legalized a new type of 
gambling activity destined to gain great success: slot machines. The introduction of slot 
machines represented a great innovation in gambling market as it brought gambling 
among ordinary people, due to the fact that, after 2003, slot machines can be placed in 
cafe, tobacco shop, stations and supermarkets without being confined to casinos; 
                                                        
2 The SGP is represented by a set of rules in terms of fiscal deficit and public debt that should be 
satisfied for all Member States and that have been established in order to make public finances 
sustainable over the cycle. 
3 For a short description of the  games see Appendix 1. 
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therefore, gambling consumption became a constant presence in routine life for more 
and more people.  
After 2003, the great expansion of gambling continued, with the progressive 
legalization of other gambling products: on-line games have been progressively 
liberalized in the period 2008-2011, several instant lotteries have been introduced in 
2009, Video-Lotteries in 2010, Online Poker in 2011.  
It is thus evident that, in Italy, the government obtained a huge development of 
gambling industry through an increase in gambling tax base: this target was pursued  
through a massive increase in available games and operators in the market and 
through a simultaneous reduction in tax rates on recently introduced games.  
However the huge development of gambling market inflamed the debate on 
morality of gambling promotion by the government. Indeed, even if gambling is not 
coercive, the gains in tax revenues are not devoid of social costs: the number of people 
devoting a significant amount of money in gambling products is increasing with the 
amount of available public games: thus the issue of problematic gamblers is becoming 
a more and more serious problem. In addition, many studies showed that gambling 
tends to be more problematic among poorer individuals who are more fascinated by 
the hope of a life change (e.g. Clotfelter, 1979; Kitchen and Powells, 1991; Combs et 
al., 2008 Beckert and Lutter, 2009). All the aforesaid issues gave rise to a debate on the 
morality of state in the legalization and, above all, promotion of gambling (Smith, 
2000); Viti de Marco et al. (1936), already in 1930s, investigated the inconsistent role 
of the government in gambling market, stating that the state has, at the same time, 
the duty to fight against the vice from which it can derive a big profit.  
Despite the rapid development of gambling market, in Italy the literature on 
gambling fiscal system is still lacking. To the best of our knowledge only one study 
(Sarti and Triventi, 2012) focused the attention on Italian gambling fiscal system 
studying the potential regressivity of gambling taxation; however, no studies have 
been developed on the specific characteristics of fiscal system spit by game typology. 
The aim of this paper is to try to fill this gap, through the study of the evolution of 
gambling market in Italy, analyzing some characteristics of gambling fiscal system in 
this context of market development. In particular we will focus the attention on the 
characteristics of gambling tax revenues in terms of growth and variability over the 
business cycle, trying to understand if gambling tax revenue represents a significant 
alternative source of tax revenue for the government and if it is a stable and 
predictable source of revenue in the short and long run. In order to do so, we will 
compute some measures of income elasticity of different categories of gambling tax 
revenues (i.e Lotto, Instant Lotteries, Entertainment Machines) using data of the Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) under a short and long run perspective. 
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The paper is organized in 6 sections; after the introduction, the second section 
reviews the literature on the topic; the third one analyzes the evolution of gambling 
market in Italy; the fourth and the fifth provide the method and the empirical results 
of our modeling. The paper ends with conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. Literature Background 
Traditionally two elements are considered in the evaluation of a tax system: 
efficiency and equity. However, in addition to the two aforesaid elements, Clotfelter 
(2005) identifies adequacy and stability as important issues to be considered by 
practical-minded tax analysts. A tax satisfies adequacy principle if tax revenues 
collected are relevant with respect of total amount of tax revenues. When considering 
gambling tax revenue this is a difficult condition to be satisfied as generally gambling 
revenues represent a definitely small amount of total tax revenues; however, 
Clotfelter (2005) shows that Italy and Australia make exception as gambling tax 
revenues, in 1999, accounted to more than 1.5% of total tax revenue (in detail to 2.4% 
for Italy), and thus they were a relevant source of tax revenue. According to our 
estimation based on data provided by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(MEF) the percentage of gambling tax revenues (Lotto + Instant Lotteries + 
Entertainment Machines + Other Games) over the total amount of tax revenues in Italy 
is increasing over time and, in 2013, it accounted to 2.87% making gambling a more 
and more important source of revenue for the Italian government. 
 In  addition to adequacy, governments are often interested in the long and short 
term variability of different tax bases and in how they are affected by variation in 
income. Indeed, in periods of financial distress, it is important to understand on which 
resources the government can rely in the short run (cyclical variability of tax revenues) 
and on which it can rely under a long run perspective (trend growth rate of tax 
revenues). From a short run perspective, governments are interested in guaranteeing 
the quality and quantity of public services offered, and, in order to do so, they need a 
stable amount of tax revenues able to finance properly fundamental public services. 
On the other side, when focusing on long run purposes, governments aim at 
maximizing tax revenue growth in order to improve the public services provision and 
quality. 
However, stability of revenue and growth are not always compatible; some 
authors (e.g. Fox and Campbell, 1984) pointed out that there is a trade-off between tax 
revenue growth in the long run and stability of tax revenues in the short run, while 
others (Dye and McGuire, 1991) find that sometimes growth and stability can be 
directly correlated; indeed in principle, high long term growth can be compatible with 
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short-term stability (Wolswijk, 2009). As stated by Groves and Kahn (1952) a fair 
taxation system is one that ensures to the government an approximately constant 
amount of revenue over a time period and that thus permits to finance major public 
services without depending too much on the business cycle conditions. 
In order to measure the impact of variation in income on gambling tax base a 
commonly used approach is by the use of two measures (one for the short run and one 
for the long run) of income elasticity. In particular, more income elastic tax bases are 
more likely to grow fast in the long term because, as income increases, the tax base 
would increase more than income (Groves and Kahn, 1952). In addition, high income 
elastic taxes in the short run would experience fluctuations of tax base over the 
business cycle, making the tax base, and consequently the tax revenues, unstable and 
uncertain. Different measures and econometric techniques have been proposed in the 
literature to estimate the short and long run income elasticity of several tax bases.  
The first study in this direction was proposed by Groves and Kahn (1952) who 
computed a measure of income elasticity for local taxes for several USA states. If we 
consider a time period between ݐ଴ and ݐଵ, income elasticity of a tax base is defined as 
the ratio between the percentage change over the period of time in tax yield T and the 
percentage change in income Y during the same period of time: 
 
ߝ = ( ଵܶ − ଴ܶ) [( ଵܶ + ଴ܶ)/2]⁄( ଵܻ − ଴ܻ) [( ଵܻ + ଴ܻ)/2⁄ ]  (1) 
  
where the numerator of equation 1 represents the ratio between change in tax 
yield between ݐ଴ and ݐଵ and the average tax yields between the two periods, whereas 
the denominator represents the ratio between change in income between ݐ଴ and ݐଵ 
and the average income of the two periods. 
Using the value of income elasticity as a benchmark, Groves and Kahn (1952) 
identified three types of taxes depending on income elasticity value: 
1. income elasticity less than one: these taxes are the most stable as an elasticity 
smaller than unity guarantees that tax bases fluctuate less than income. 
According to Groves and Kahn (1952) licences, property taxes and pool taxes 
belong to this category; 
2. income elasticity close to one: these taxes vary proportionally with income, 
meaning that they are roughly unstable. Sales taxes are often considered in this 
category; 
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3. income elasticity bigger than one: these taxes vary more than proportionally to 
income. This means that they are strongly unstable over the business cycle. 
Corporate net income taxes usually have an income elasticity bigger than one. 
 
Applications to general sales and income tax base 
Studies based on the Groves and Kahn (1952) approach have been developed, 
among the others, by Fox and Campbell (1984), Dye and McGuire (1991), Sobel and 
Holcombe (1996), Bruce et al. (2006). Many authors focus the analysis on different 
categories of sales taxes, finding out how income elasticity varies over different goods. 
Fox and Campbell (1984) analyze the income elasticity of ten taxable sales groups, 
finding out that differences exist over different groups. The main differences are 
observed among durable and nondurable goods; in particular durable goods tax base 
declines during economic recession and boosts in expansion period, while the contrary 
is true for nondurable goods. Other authors (Dye and McGuire, 1991; Bruce et al., 
2006) analyze the elasticity of income taxes in different USA states. Bruce et al., 2006 
find out that flat and progressive income tax base tend to be more elastic than sales 
tax bases, and thus more unstable. However, not all the studies agree on this 
conclusion; among the others, Fox and Campbell (1984) find out that certain income 
tax bases can be more stable than sales tax bases. In addition, the authors observe 
that income tax bases tend to fluctuate less than sales tax bases over the business 
cycle in the short run. Bruce et al. (2006)  perform a similar analysis on short and long 
run income elasticity of sales tax bases and income tax bases, finding out that, overall, 
long run income elasticity for personal income tax base is more than double the one 
for sales taxes.  
Research on this topic in Europe are lacking; Wolswijk (2009) proposes a study in 
this direction applied to three tax categories (i.e. value-added tax, personal income tax 
and corporate income tax) in the Netherlands. Results show that short run elasticity 
estimates tend to be different from long run ones, especially when tax bases are below 
the long run equilibrium. This means that economic agents tend to react slowly to 
variation in income, as responses are lagged and smaller in the short run. In particular, 
for what concerns value-added tax (VAT) the author find out a long run elasticity of 
0.9, and two short run elasticity estimates (when tax base are respectively below and 
above the equilibrium) of 0.64 and 1.10. This fact can be explained by a change in 
consumption habits towards more basic (less taxed) goods during recession, and, 
conversely, by a shift towards the consumption of more luxurious (and thus taxed) 
goods during economic expansion. Different conclusions emerge for income tax bases. 
Personal income tax (PIT) has been found to have a symmetric short run response and 
to be more reactive in the short run, experiencing a short run elasticity bigger than the 
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long run one (1.89 versus 1.57); this can be explained by the slowness in employment 
adjustments. Lastly, corporate income taxes (CIT) tend to be more reactive in the long 
run, recording a long run elasticity bigger than one (1.07) versus two short run 
estimates of 0.12 (when tax base is below long run equilibrium) and 0.90 (when tax 
base is above long run equilibrium).  
 
Applications to gambling tax base 
As we already said, the vast majority of studies focusing on income elasticity of tax 
base focused the analysis on sales and income taxes. However, theoretically, similar 
approaches can be applied to any types of tax bases, including the gambling tax base. 
Some previous researches focus the attention on gambling taxation. In particular, the 
first study in this direction has been proposed by Cargill and Eadington (1978) who 
analyze the income elasticity of casino gambling revenues in three regions of Nevada, 
finding out that gross casino gambling revenue is fairly elastic and that the estimates 
vary across regions from 1.05 to 1.75. A similar study has been performed for Brazil by 
Babbel and Staking (1983). A more recent research has been proposed by Nichols and 
Tosun (2008), who analyze the long and short run income elasticity of casino gambling 
revenues using quarterly data of 11 USA states and observing how gambling revenues 
differ from other types of tax bases (i.e. sales taxes and income taxes). The authors 
improve on previous studies: indeed they use quarterly data as in Fox and Campbell 
(1984) but they extend the analysis to more than one state using a panel dataset. In 
addition they use actual tax base rather than a proxy for it as in previous researches 
and they introduced in the model three variables that describe the supply-side of 
casino gambling industry (i.e. number of slots machines lagged two quarters, number 
of table games lagged two quarters, seasonal dummies) to take into account the 
specific characteristics of the sector. Nichols and Tosun (2008) find out that, in the long 
run, gross casino revenues generally grow faster than other sales tax bases but slower 
than income tax base. For what concern the short run, their estimates on gambling 
elasticity are usually lower than estimates for sales and income tax base, meaning that 
gambling revenues tend to fluctuate less than other tax bases over the business cycle.  
 
3. Gambling in Italy: data and recent development of the market 
The development of gambling market 
During the last decade in Italy gambling market experienced a dramatic boost: 
after the liberalization of 2003 which legalized new forms of gambling (i.e. slots 
machines) the amount of money devoted to gambling significantly increased, leading 
to an explosion of the market. 
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In Italy three main measures are used to evaluate gambling market: gross 
expenditure, net expenditure and tax revenue. The gross expenditure represents the 
total amount of money that is devoted to gambling, which means the total amount of 
money bet, whereas the net expenditure is the net amount of money spent in 
gambling after subtracting the payout (i.e. money that goes back to the consumer 
through winnings). Thus: 
 
ܩݎ݋ݏݏ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ = ෍ ܤ݁ݐ௞
௞
 (2) 
 
ܰ݁ݐ ܧݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ = ෍ (ܤ݁ݐ௞
௞
− ܲܽݕ݋ݑݐ௞) (3) 
 
It is evident that these two measures, even though highly correlated, provide 
different information: the first is a measure of the global gambling market, while the 
latter is a measure of the impact of gambling on households budget. In addition, for 
the vast majority of games, gross expenditure represents the tax base on which tax 
rates are applied to get tax revenue.  
The amount of tax revenue is a further measure that should be considered when 
analyzing gambling market from the government point of view as it represents the 
total amount of economic resources that the government gets from gambling 
activities. It has been showed that the dynamics of gambling tax revenue is generally 
different from the dynamics of gambling expenditure due to the different tax systems 
applied to different games. 
9 
 
Table 1: Gross Expenditure and its variation (2003-2012) split by game 
-data in millions of euro- (source: Italian Customs and Monopolies Agency)- 
 
Table 1 and Figure 1 show how gross expenditure evolved during the last ten 
years: overall, total gross expenditure increased by 481% recording, in 2012, a total 
amount of gross expenditure of more than 80 billions of euro; this phenomenon was 
mainly caused by the change in the government attitude towards gambling, namely by 
the introduction of new games (e.g. slot machines) which boost gambling 
opportunities during everyday life. If we analyze the evolution of gross expenditure 
split by game typology we can see that the games more responsible for gambling 
growth are the most modern ones: in particular slots machines (slots) and video-
lotteries (vlts) (which we will referred to as "Entertainment Machines") which have 
Year Variable Lotto 
Superena
lotto Lottery 
Sport 
Betting 
Horse 
racing Bingo 
Slots 
and Vlt 
Skill 
Games – 
Online 
Poker 
Total 
2003 
Total 6,938 2,066 282 1,123 2,974 1,257 367 - 15,007 
% of total  46% 14% 2% 7% 20% 8% 2% - 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) - - - - - - - - - 
2004 
Total 11,689 1,836 594 1,300 2,908 1,542 4,474 - 24,343 
% of total  48% 8% 2% 5% 12% 6% 18% - 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) +68% -11% +111% +16% -2% +23% +1,119% - +62% 
2005 
Total 7,315 1,981 1,546 1,488 2,820 1,553 11,470 - 28,173 
% of total  26% 7% 5% 5% 10% 6% 41% - 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -37% +8% +160% +14% -3% +1% +156% - +16% 
2006 
Total 6,588 2,000 3,970 2,281 2,912 1,755 15,436 - 34,942 
% of total  19% 6% 11% 7% 8% 5% 44% - 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -10% +1% +157% +53% +3% +13% +35% - +24% 
2007 
Total 6,177 1,940 7,955 2,591 2,748 1,726 18,827 - 41,964 
% of total  15% 5% 19% 6% 7% 4% 45% - 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -6% -3% +100% +14% -6% -2% +22% - +20% 
2008 
Total 5,852 2,509 9,274 3,909 2,272 1,636 21,685 242 47,379 
% of total  12% 5% 20% 8% 5% 3% 46% 1% 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -5% +29% +17% +51% -17% -5% +15% - +13% 
2009 
Total 5,664 3,782 9,434 4,026 1,981 1,512 25,525 2,348 54,272 
% of total  10% 7% 17% 7% 4% 3% 47% 4% 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -3% +51% +2% +3% -13% -8% +18% +870% +15% 
2010 
Total 5,231 3,525 9,367 4,396 1,729 1,954 32,000 3,145 61,347 
% of total  9% 6% 15% 7% 3% 3% 52% 5% 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -8% -7% -1% +9% -13% +29% +25% +34% +13% 
2011 
Total 6,800 2,400 10,200 3,910 1,370 1,850 44,900 8,420 79,850 
% of total  9% 3% 13% 5% 2% 2% 56% 11% 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) +30% -32% +9% -11% -21% -5% +40% +168% +30% 
2012 
Total 6,215 1,800 9,800 3,980 1,010 1,655 48,700 13,980 87,140 
% of total  7% 2% 11% 5% 1% 2% 56% 16% 100% %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -9% -25% -4% 2% -26% -11% +8% +66% +9% Total %Variation (2003-2012) -10% -13% +3,375% +254% -66% +32% 13,170% +495% +481% 
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been legalized respectively in 2003 and 2010 and which experienced an average 
increase of 72% a year: the gross expenditure connected to entertainment machines 
(i.e. slots + vlts) became a more and more relevant percentage of total gross 
expenditure, moving from 2% in 2003to 56% of total gross expenditure in 2012.  
 
 
Figure 1: Gross Expenditure ( billions of euro) , Tax Revenues ( billions of euro),  
% of Gambling tax on total Tax Revenues, Average Tax Rate 
- source: Italian Customs and Monopolies Agency - 
 
On the other side, expenditure in games that have been introduced earlier (i.e. 
Lotto, Superenalotto) remained  quite constant during the last 10 years and became a 
less relevant percentage of total gross expenditure; gross expenditure in Lotto moved 
from 46% of total expenditure in 2003 to 7% in 2012; in addition, expenditure in horse 
related games declined (-66%). The expenditure in lottery tickets increased thanks to 
the great increase in instantaneous lottery tickets available. Also online skills games 
and online poker, which have been legalized respectively in 2008 and 2011 
experienced a great expansion, with a total increase of 495% in only 5 years.  
The main reason for the government to promote gambling is economic: tax 
revenues deriving from gambling guarantee to the government a precious source of 
funds that can be used to finance several public needs.  
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Table 2 and Figure 1 show some figures on gambling tax revenue evolution. Tax 
revenues increased significantly during the time period (2003-2012) moving from 3,5 
billions of euro in 2003 to more than 8 billions in 2012 (+135%). If we split the analysis 
by game type we can see (Table 2) that a big part of the increase in tax revenues 
derives from lotteries, slots and video-lotteries. However, the increase in tax revenues 
is much lower than the increase in gross gambling expenditure (overall, +135% tax 
revenues versus +481% of gross expenditure), and total tax revenues experience a 
reduction after 2010. 
This phenomenon can be explained analyzing the gambling tax system (Giuricin, 
2013). In Italy the gambling taxation system is not homogeneous as different games 
have different tax systems and tax rates (Table 3); for some games (i.e. Lotto and 
Instant lotteries) tax revenues are derived from the differential between the total 
amount of money bet by gamblers and the money returned to players as winning. For 
all the other games the tax base is represented by gross expenditure; however, as it is 
showed by Table 3, tax rates applied to different games vary significantly. In particular 
recently introduced games tend to have lower average rates than older games: video-
lotteries have particularly low tax rates (i.e. 4.00 %), while for slots machines tax rates 
for tax payers decrease if total gross expenditure is higher than the one obtained the 
previous year leading to an incentive for tax payers to boost demand. On the other 
hand, older games tend to be subject to higher tax rates; for example Superenalotto is 
subject to particularly high tax rates, namely 53.62 %.  
This phenomenon of decrease in tax rates applied to gambling is a consequence of 
the change in the government attitude towards gambling. Fiasco (2011), a sociologist 
specialized in research on gambling in Italy at the National anti-Usury Council, 
identifies different steps in governments behaviour on gambling regulation. During the 
period 1992-2002 the government was focused on maximizing tax revenues (the so-
called period of `generate tax revenues`): therefore the government tried to find the 
equilibrium between taxation level and demand. On the contrary, after 2003, the main 
aim of the government became to increase market value (the so-called period of 
`generate market value`) and thus to decrease tax rates in order to boost the demand 
for gambling. For this reason, new games have been subjected to lower tax rates, in 
order to incentivize demand that increases tax revenues. As a consequence, the total 
amount of tax revenues collected increased in absolute numbers, but the percentage 
revenues for each euro decreased.   
 
 
12 
 
Table 2: Tax Revenue and its variation (2003-2012)  
-Data in millions of euro (source: Italian Customs and Monopolies Agency)- 
 
Game Tax Base Tax Rates 
Lotto    -  Differential  
Superenalotto  Gross Expenditure    53.62% 
Lottery  -    Differential  
Sport Betting  Gross Expenditure    From 2.00%  to 33.84%  
Horse racing  Gross Expenditure   From 6.00%  to 15.70%  
Bingo Gross Expenditure  11% 
Slot - VLT  Gross Expenditure   From 4.00% to 13.00 %  
Table 3: Tax base and tax rates by game (source: Chamber of Deputies, 2012) 
 
Year Variable Lotto 
Superen
alotto Lottery 
Sport 
Betting 
Horse 
racing Bingo 
Slots and 
Vlt 
Skill 
Games 
– Online 
Poker 
Total 
2003 
Total 1,565 1,100 114 297 144 251 33 - 3,504 
% of total  45% 31% 3% 8% 4% 7% 1% - 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) - - - - - - - - 
 2004 
Total 4,919 976 219 222 141 308 513 - 7,298 
% of total  67% 13% 3% 3% 2% 4% 7% - 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) +214% -11% +92% -25% -2% +23% +1,455% - +108% 
2005 
Total 2,425 1,054 426 290 137 311 1,514 - 6,157 
% of total  39% 17% 7% 5% 2% 5% 25% - 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -51% +8% +95% +31% -3% +1% +195% - -16% 
2006 
Total 1,959 1,013 891 291 141 351 2,072 - 6,718 
% of total  29% 15% 13% 4% 2% 5% 31% - 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -19% -4% +109% +0% +3% +13% +37% - +9% 
2007 
Total 1,747 962 1,526 230 134 345 2,250 - 7,194 
% of total  24% 13% 21% 3% 2% 5% 31% - 1 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -11% -5% +71% -21% -5% -2% +9% - +7% 
2008 
Total 1,565 1,235 1,659 249 110 327 2,594 7 7,746 
% of total  20% 16% 21% 3% 1% 4% 33% 0% 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -10% +28% +9% +8% -18% -5% +15% - +8% 
2009 
Total 1,591 1,736 1,663 218 97 270 3,165 70 8,810 
% of total  18% 20% 19% 2% 1% 3% 36% 1% 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) +2% +41% +0% -12% -12% -17% +22% +900% +14% 
2010 
Total 1,250 1,578 1,545 213 83 214 3,756 94 8,733 
% of total  14% 18% 18% 2% 1% 2% 43% 1% 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -21% -9% -7% -2% -14% -21% +19% +34% -1% 
2011 
Total 1,737 1,081 1,330 184 66 231 3,916 103 8,648 
% of total  20% 13% 15% 2% 1% 3% 45% 1% 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) +39% -31% -14% -14% -20% +8% +4% +10% -1% 
2012 
Total 1,134 810 1,590 177 48 206 4,154 108 8,227 
% of total  14% 10% 19% 2% 1% 3% 50% 1% 100% 
 %∆(࢚, ࢚ − ૚) -35% -25% +20% -4% -27% -11% +6% +5% -5% Total %∆ (૛૙૚૛,૛૙૙૜) -28% -26% +1,295% -40% -67% -18% +12,488% +1,443% +135% 
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Therefore, average tax rate is significantly changing due to the introduction of 
new, less taxed, high-demanded games (Figure 1). In detail, average tax rate4 
decreased over time moving between 2003 and 2013 from 23% to 9%. Among games, 
lotteries experienced a significant negative trend in the evolution of rates: tax rates 
moved from 40% in 2003 to 16 % in 2012.  Even more intense is the drop in average 
rate connected to sport betting: it decreases by 83 % in ten years.  
 
Data on gambling in Italy 
One of the main limits of developing analysis on gambling in Italy is the lack of 
easily available data on the topic. Different subjects are responsible for the collection 
and processing of data on gambling. The main data source is the Italian Customs and 
Monopolies Agency which is the administration created to deal with the responsibility 
of ruling state monopolies. In addition to Italian Customs and Monopolies Agency 
other institutions provide data on gambling:  specialized news agencies (e.g. 
Agipronews, Agicos, Agimeg, Agicops), gambling authorities, organizations dealing with 
pathological gambling, Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), Italian Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT), Italian Anti-Drug Department (DPA) and the National Research 
Council (CNR). 
For what concern data useful for our analysis, we are mainly interested in data on 
gambling tax revenues and tax bases. In Italy data on gambling tax revenue can be 
directly obtained from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) website 
which reports, both by cash and competence criteria, the amount of tax revenues 
derived from Lotto, lotteries and entertainment machines (i.e. slots machines and 
video-lotteries) at a monthly level for the period 1990-2014. In addition to this dataset, 
a monthly report is published by the Court of Auditors which permits to obtain annual 
tax revenues from 1995 to 2013 well detailed by game typology. The longest time 
series of tax revenues can be obtained by ISTAT which reports the total amount of 
indirect tax collected by the government split by tax category. Tax categories include 
four game typologies (i.e. Casino, Lotto and lotteries, sport betting, horse racing, skill 
games and other bets) for the last 23 years (1990-2012).  
On the other side, a proxy for tax base can be obtained by the Italian Customs and 
Monopolies Agency which provides, on request, data on gross expenditure at a 
monthly level for the last years and by game typology (i.e. Entertainment machines, 
Bingo, Horse racing, sport betting, lotteries, Lotto, Superenalotto, skill games).   
In this paper we will use data on tax revenues provided by the MEF aggregated at a 
quarterly level: the dataset reports, the inflows in several types of taxes using cash 
                                                        
4 Average tax rate has been computed as the ratio between the total amount of tax revenues and 
Gross Expenditure 
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(1990-2001) and competence (2002-2014) criteria. Previous studies (e.g. Fox and 
Campbell, 1984) showed that using quarterly data instead of yearly data brings some 
benefits as it permits to have more degrees of freedom. However, as gambling tax 
revenues can be influenced by government decisions on fiscal system (e.g. change in 
tax rates, increase in the number of licences, promotion of gambling), some control 
variables connected to the market should be included. 
Table 4: Some descriptives of the variables  
 
We consider three categories of gambling activities: lotto, instant lotteries, 
entertainment machines5 (Table 4), which represent, in 2012, respectively the 14%, 
19% and 50% of total amount of gambling tax revenues. Due to the lack of available 
data we are not able to use tax bases for all game types. In particular, tax revenues 
have been considered as a good proxy for tax base for Lotto as revenues for the 
government on these game derived from the difference between money spent and 
money given back as winning.  
We instead use entertainment machines and instant lotteries tax bases computing 
them as the ratio between tax revenue and average tax rate for each year6: we believe 
that considering tax base rather than tax revenue is particularly important for these 
categories of gambling activities due to the important legislative reforms that impact 
on Instant Lotteries and Entertainment machines during the last years; in addition, due 
to the great expansion of instant lotteries after 2003 we select as period of analysis for 
this game only data related to the last decade.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of gambling and GDP time series over the period 
considered. The three gambling series experienced different trends: while lotto 
revenues recorded only a minor growth over the 23 year-period considered, 
entertainment machines tax base boomed impressively during the last ten years; on 
the other side, instant lottery tax base experienced a high growth level during the 
period (2005-2008), while stabilizing in the following years (2008-2013). 
                                                        
5 Entertainment machines include slot machines (slots) and video-lotteries (vlts) revenues. 
6 Average tax rates have been computed as the ratio between the total amount of tax revenues and 
Gross Expenditure for each year (source of data: Italian Customs and Monopolies Agency) 
Tax 
Time period 
considered 
Number of 
observations 
Mean per 
quarter 
Standard 
deviation 
Variable 
Lotto 1990q1-2013q4 96 1.49 billions 1.36e+09 Tax Revenue 
Instant Lotteries 2005q2-2013q4 35 1.77 billions 6.98e+08 Tax Base 
Entertainment 
Machines 
2004q2-2013q4 39 5.94 billions 3.02e+09 Tax Base 
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As measures of income we used three different quarterly variables: market prices 
GDP, GDP per capita, available disposal income7. Results do not differ significantly; 
therefore we will present the ones obtained through the use of aggregate GDP.  
 
 
Figure 2: Yearly gambling time series considered in our models 
-data expressed in billions of euro (source: MEF- Eurostat)- 
 
All variables have been converted in constant euro using the GDP deflator and 
their natural logs are used in the regressions. 
 
4. Econometric specification 
To empirically compute the income elasticity of tax bases, most of the early studies 
use a simple double logarithm regression of the form (Groves and Kahn, 1952): ln( ௧ܶ) = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ ln( ௧ܻ) + ݑ௧ (4) 
where ௧ܶ represents the tax yield during the period t and ௧ܻ  represents the income 
level during the period t. Due to the logarithm specification, ߙଵ provides a measure of 
the income elasticity of a tax yield. 
The main limitation of such an analysis lays in the fact that this model does not 
make a distinction between short run and long run: in particular, according to these 
early studies, ߙଵ  provides, at the same time, the potential long term growth and the 
short run variability over the business cycle. As already noticed by Sobel and Holcombe 
(1996) this is not always the case as two taxes can share the same growth pattern 
                                                        
7 The data source of all income measures is Eurostat 
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while varying differently over the business cycle. In addition, from a methodological 
point of view, the estimates computed using equation 4 are asymptomatically biased 
with inconsistent standard errors. To solve these problems, we decide to follow an 
approach already used by other authors in similar contexts (e.g. Sobel and Holcombe, 
1996; Bruce et al., 2006; Nichols and Tosun, 2008 ). In particular Sobel and Holcombe 
(1996), using USA data covering the period 1951-1991 on different types of tax bases, 
analyze precisely the principal econometric limitations affecting earlier studies (e.g. 
Groves and Kahn, 1952) and propose some solutions. First of all, in order to produce 
unbiased estimates of coefficients tax and income variables should be stationary. A 
variable following a stationary process is one that tend to return to a certain mean 
value over time. This means that, if a variable has a decreasing or increasing trend it 
cannot be stationary and thus traditional regression techniques cannot be applied. 
Most macroeconomic time series are not stationary; however, when converted in first 
differences they become stationary; if this is the case, the series are defined as co-
integrated, which means integrated of same order. With co-integrated series, 
econometric models estimate the long and short run estimates following the Engle-
Granger two step procedure (1987).  
The first step of this approach is the testing for variables stationarity and therefore 
for their level of cointegration. In general, to determine if a variable is stationary, the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (See Dickey and Fuller, 1979) is performed: a significant 
t-statistic indicates that the variable is stationary, while an insignificant t-statistic 
indicates that the variable is non-stationary. Several studies confirm that taxes and 
income variables tend to be non stationary (e.g. Sobel and Holcombe, 1996; Bruce et 
al., 2006; Nichols and Tosun, 2008). If this is the case, some corrections should be used 
on the estimation technique: first of all it is necessary to divide the analysis in short 
run estimation and long run estimation. Indeed, an estimation of income elasticity of 
tax base based on equation 4 would not take into account short run fluctuations 
around the trend, and it thus provides only an estimation for the long time period. In 
order to correct for the non stationarity of the variables it is necessary to transform 
the variables into stationary ones; this can be done either adjusting for a constant 
trend or transforming the variables into the first difference form. The second approach 
has been shown to be more effective in this context (e.g. Sobel and Holcombe, 1996; 
Bruce et al., 2006; Nichols and Tosun, 2008). 
This means that equation 4 for the short run elasticity, in presence of non 
stationary variables becomes: 
 
∆ ln( ௧ܶ) = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ∆ ln( ௧ܻ) + ݑ௧ (5) 
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where ௧ܶ represents the tax yield during the period t and ௧ܻ  the income level 
during the period t. In equation 5 all the variables are expressed in first difference form 
denoted by ∆. In this case, the coefficient ߙଵ represents the short run income elasticity 
of tax base and it measures the percentage change in tax base provoked by a one 
percent change in income. A coefficient bigger than one indicates a tax base that 
moves more than income over the business cycle while a coefficient lower than one 
indicates an opposite situation. This measure is independent of the long run elasticity 
and it just provides a measure of how tax base fluctuates up and down due to the 
business cycle adjusting immediately to income variation. 
The problem of non stationarity of the variables has consequences also on long run 
estimation as it brings to biased estimations of long run elasticity with inconsistent 
standard errors. The bias in estimation derives from the fact that estimated error 
terms tend to be correlated, leading to a problem of serial auto-correlation of the error 
term. To solve this problem, Stock and Watson (1993) propose the use of a dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS) which consists in the inclusion in the model of a proper 
number (usually five) of leads and lags of the change in the independent variable:    
 
ln( ௧ܶ) = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ln( ௧ܻ) + ෍ ߚଶ∆൫ ௧ܻା௚൯௝
௚ୀି௝
+ ߮௧  (6) 
 
The number of leads and lags to be included is usually selected looking at the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). This procedure removes coefficient bias and 
corrects for serial autocorrelation by using Newey-West correction for the standard 
error (Newey and West, 1986).  
Sobel and Holcombe (1996) identify one last problem that can affect short run 
elasticity estimation in this contest. Under a short run perspective, in any period tax 
bases can be above or below the long run equilibrium value. According to the authors, 
two non stationary variables that have a long run relationship with another one tend 
to move back together when they deviate too much from each other. This means that, 
in any time period, two short run movements coexist: on one side tax base react to 
income variation, while on the other side tax base adjust to converge to the long run 
equilibrium value. This phenomenon is usually called error correction and it 
contributes to make short run estimation biased. To solve the problem, an Error 
Correction Model (ECM) can be built through the inclusion of another variable in 
equation 6: the additional variable shows how far was the variable from the long run 
equilibrium values in the previous period. The ECM permits thus to capture both the 
aforesaid short run movements. The ECM equation is obtained using a two step 
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procedure. First of all, model of equation 4 is estimated and the connected residuals 
are computed. Than the lagged once residuals are inserted as an independent variable 
in model in order to obtain an unbiased short run income elasticity estimation using: 
 ln( ௧ܶ) − ln( ௧ܶିଵ) = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ(ln( ௧ܻ − ln( ௧ܻିଵ)) + ߙଶߤ௧ିଵ + ߭௧  (7) 
 
where ߤ௧ିଵ represents the disequilibrium between short and long run elasticity 
value. In equation 7 the parameter ߙଵ captures the short run income elasticity of tax 
base, while ߙଶ measures the size of adjustment of tax base to its long run equilibrium 
value: it provides a measure of the percentage of disequilibrium that is corrected in 
every time period.  
Some authors (e.g. Bruce et al., 2006) believe that a more appropriate approach 
should consider an asymmetric response of tax base to income variation depending on 
the position with respect to long run equilibrium value. To allow for an asymmetric 
reaction, Bruce et al. (2006) propose to insert in equation 7 a dummy variable ܦ௧  that 
assumes value 0 if the short run tax base is below its long run equilibrium and value 1 
if the contrary is true. 
 
Δ T୲ = ߙ଴ + ߙଵ Δ ௧ܻ + ߙଶߤ௧ିଵ +  ߠଵ(ܦ௧ ∗ Δ ௧ܻ) + ߠଶ(ܦ௧ ∗ ߤ௧ିଵ) + ߭௧  (8) 
  
where ΔT୲ and Δ ௧ܻ  represents respectively the difference between the logarithm 
of tax base and income at time ݐ and the corresponding value at time ݐ − 1. In 
equation 8 short run elasticity and the adjustment parameters are estimated 
separately depending on the position respect to long run equilibrium: in particular, ߙଵ 
and ߠଵ  represent the short run income elasticity when tax base is respectively below 
and above the long run equilibrium. If  ߠଵ is statistically different from zero this means 
that the upward adjustment when tax base is below equilibrium is different from the 
downward adjustment when tax base is above equilibrium. In addition, ߙଶ and ߠଶ 
represent the size and speed of adjustment to the long run equilibrium when tax base 
is respectively below and above long run equilibrium value.  
 
5. Results 
Table 6 shows long run estimates of income elasticity while Table 7-8 shows short 
run elasticity estimates.  
As we explained in paragraph 4, in order to applied the just described econometric 
techniques, the first problem to be analyzed is on the stationarity of the variables. 
Table 4 reports the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 
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1979): a significant value of the statistic indicates that the variable is stationary. 
Results show that Lotto seems to be stationarity in level while all the other variables 
are not stationarity in their regular form. However, if we consider variables in their 
difference form we see that all variables are stationarity, suggesting that they are 
integrated of order one. Therefore, for Lotto category we will analyze results of 
traditional models, while we will deal with non stationarity related issues for 
Entertainment Machines and Instant Lotteries tax base. 
 
Variable 
Test for stationarity 
in level 
Test for difference 
stationarity 
Lotto -8.914 (***) -16.697 (***) 
Instant Lotteries -2.831 -5.969 (***) 
Entertaiment Machines - 1.627 -12.405 (***) 
GDP -2.067 -10.326 (***) 
Table 5: Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Stationarity Test 
(* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
 
In order to account for the great market expansion of gambling market we decide 
to include some control variables in the models following Nichols and Tosun (2008) 
approach. Omitting supply-driven changes may lead to omitted variables bias since 
gambling revenues can depend on factors other than income (e.g. number of licences 
or machines). Among game categories that we selected we can divide games in two 
main groups: the first one composed by Lotto which represents the most mature 
gambling market: indeed, Lotto has been first introduced in Italy long time ago: already 
during the XIX century Lotto was popular in several cities of Italy. Unlikely other types 
of games, during the last decades, Lotto has not experienced huge incentives and 
legislative reforms by the government and thus it has not been involved in the great 
expansion of the market. On the other side, Entertainment Machines (which include 
slots machines and video-lotteries) and Instant Lotteries represent two recently 
introduced booming markets, highly promoted by the government through the 
introduction of more and more slots machines, licences and lottery tickets. These 
distinctions among games, make us select different controls variables to take into 
account the single peculiarities of the markets. In particular we include in all the 
regressions seasonal dummies to account for potential seasonal variations; in addition 
we include some variables specific for each market: to take into account the expansion 
of Entertainment machines and Instant Lotteries market we include a variable 
reporting the number of workers employed in Arts, Entertainment, Recreation sector 
(Eurostat Nace Classification = R) as a measure of the development of gambling 
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market8. When running regression on Entertainment machine we also include a 
dummy variable that has value one after 2010, which is the year of legalization of a 
new type of  innovative and successful entertainment machine (i.e. Videolottery). On 
the other side, when running models on instant lotteries we include a variable that 
records the total number of instant lottery tickets introduced each year as a measure 
of the increase in the available instant lottery tickets. We do not include these control 
variables for Lotto category due to the fact that this sector was less involved in the 
great expansion of the market and in the huge increase in licences, number of 
machines and available lottery tickets; however, for what concerns Lotto regressions, 
we include a variables recording the total number of monthly lotto extractions (which 
move from 4 in 1990 to 12 in 2013). 
 
OLS OLS with control variables 
DOLS with control 
variables 
LONG RUN 
ELASTICITY Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value 
Lotto 5.02 0.76 0.00 5.88 1.53 0.00 7.10 2.03 0.00 
Instant Lotteries -3.31 3.94 0.41 15.07 3.59 0.00 24.20 6.50 0.00 
Entertaiment 
Machines -8.30 4.03 0.05 6.03 2.60 0.03 9.97 7.12 0.17 
Table 6: Long run income elasticity estimates. 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the models: the β coefficients indicate how fast a tax 
base revenue grows with respect to income under a long run perspective. We can see 
from table 6 that coefficients are significant and bigger than one for Lotto, meaning 
that tax revenues tend to grow more rapidly than income for this game. Results are 
confirmed when including control variables and when correcting for serial correlation 
using DOLS with Newey-West standard errors. For what concern Instant Lotteries and 
Entertainment Machines tax bases, results seem to be less stable: from estimations 
with control variables it is evident that both game types tend to grow much faster than 
income in the long run, recording particularly high coefficients of income elasticity.  
Generally the coefficients connected to these two games categories are bigger than 
the ones for Lotto: this fact can be a consequence of the different level of growth 
among mature Lotto market and more innovative slots and lotteries markets. These 
coefficients are also much higher than the coefficients traditionally obtained for sales 
and income taxes (Sobel and Holcombe, 1996, Bruce et al. ,2006) suggesting that 
gambling tax bases seem to grow more than other forms of tax bases in the long run 
                                                        
8 Unluckily more suitable control variables (i.e. number of slots machines or licences) are still not 
available for all the time series considered. 
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adapting to income variations. Therefore, policy makers can consider gambling tax 
base a particularly important source of revenue in the long run as it is expected to 
increase impressively adapting to GDP variation.  
For what concerns short run estimates, due to the non stationarity of some of the 
variables considered, variables should be transformed in their stationary form (first 
differences); thus the basic model for short run elasticity is estimated using equation 5. 
Johansen (1988) test for cointegration reveals a cointegrating relationship between 
income and tax base variables. Therefore we run three error correction models 
(equation 7) comparing the results with the ones obtained using more traditional 
models (equation 5). ECM provides two different coefficients of interest: the first is the 
estimation of the short run elasticity, while the second is the adjustment coefficient to 
long run equilibrium. Indeed, the change in bases in the short run can be provoked by 
two effects: the change in income and the adjustment to long run equilibrium. Short 
run elasticity measures the cyclical component of tax base variability: a coefficient 
bigger than one indicate a variable that fluctuates more than income over the business 
cycle. From results we see Lotto tends to move faster than income, while instant 
lotteries seem to be countercyclical, having a negative reaction to increase in income 
in the short run and therefore rising during recession and dropping in periods of 
economic booms. The other tax bases estimates turn out to be not significantly 
different from zero; this suggests that, immediate reaction of gambling revenue 
towards variation in income do not seem to be important for Entertainment Machines.  
The second coefficient estimated by ECM is the adjustment parameter which 
represents the percentage of last period's deviation from equilibrium that is corrected 
in each period; we see that Lotto and Entertainment machines revenues tend to have a 
high adjustment parameters, meaning that in each quarter respectively the 81% and 
the 51% of deviation from long run equilibrium is corrected. 
 
SHORT RUN  
ELASTICITY 
BASIC MODEL BASIC MODEL with control variables ECM with control variables 
Coeff Std Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value 
Adj to 
LR 
Std 
Error 
P 
value 
Lotto 14.19 5.60 0.01 -5.47 7.41 0.46 18.10 4.78 0.00 -0.81 0.13 0.00 
Instant Lotteries -8.07 4.58 0.09 4.64 4.29 0.30 -7.97 4.50 0.09 -0.23 0.16 0.09 
Entertaiment 
Machines 4.74 4.74 0.32 2.90 6.43 0.65 5.64 4.31 0.20 -0.51 0.17 0.00 
Table 7: Short run income elasticity coefficients. 
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One last potential problem affecting short run estimated concern the possible 
presence of an asymmetric response depending of the position with respect to long 
run equilibrium. Indeed, in each quarters tax base can be either above (period of 
economic wellbeing) or under (period of economic recession) the long run equilibrium. 
To analyze this issue, as suggested by Bruce et al. (2006) we run an asymmetric ECM 
(equation 8). Table 8 reports the results: both two income elasticity and adjustments 
parameters have been computed depending on the current position with respect to 
long run equilibrium elasticity. The short run elasticity measures when tax base is 
below long run equilibrium tend to be not statistically different from zero; however 
short run income elasticity coefficient when tax base in above equilibrium is significant 
for Lotto: this suggest that there is an asymmetric reaction to income variation 
depending on the position with respect to equilibrium for this category of game. In 
particular, Lotto tend to be more reactive when tax base is above long run equilibrium: 
this suggests that Lotto tax revenues respond slowly to an increase in income when 
they are below long run level, meaning that during recession periods they react slowly 
to signs of recovery. On the contrary Lotto revenues tend to be more reactive when 
above long run equilibrium, which means in period of economic wellbeing. On the 
other side differences in short run coefficients are not statistically significant for 
Entertainment Machines.  The adjustments parameters varies across games and they 
are generally significant when below the equilibrium: however, the adjustment 
coefficients when above equilibrium are not significant: this suggests that there are 
not important differences between speed of adjustment depending on the position 
with respect to long run equilibrium.  
 
ASYMMETRIC 
SHORT RUN 
ELASTICITY 
Short run elasticity Adjustment to Equilibrium 
ECM below Long Run 
equilibrium 
ECM above LR 
equilibrium 
ECM below LR 
equilibrium 
ECM above LR 
equilibrium 
Coeff Std Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value Coeff 
Std 
Error 
P 
value 
Lotto 6.84 6.52 0.30 21.18 10.28 0.04 -0.90 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.48 0.71 
Instant Lotteries -5.32 6.27 0.40 -6.11 9.66 0.53 -0.66 0.44 0.30 0.77 0.73 0.30 
Entertaiment 
Machines 2.94 5.61 0.60 6.16 10.08 0.55 -0.72 0.27 0.01 0.76 0.62 0.23 
Table 8: Asymmetric short run income elasticity coefficients. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper examined Italian gambling fiscal system, trying to understand the 
evolution of tax revenues during recent years and some characteristics of the system.  
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The analysis of gambling gross expenditure suggests that gambling in Italy is a 
booming market, recording impressively high rate of growth, especially in recently 
introduced games. In addition, when looking at tax revenues, the descriptive analysis  
shows that the progressive decrease in tax rates applied to new games is leading to an 
increasing demand but also to a decreasing tax revenue for each euro bet. 
The analysis of the long and short run elasticity of different types of gambling 
products revenues, help us in the understanding of the comparative dynamics of 
different gambling tax bases. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on the 
characteristics of gambling fiscal system spit by game types.  
From a policy maker point of view long run estimates provide an indication of long 
run revenue growth, while short run coefficients represent the cyclical variability of tax 
base over the business cycle. Results show that long and short run estimates may 
significantly deviate from each other.  
Long run elasticity estimates suggest that gambling activities (e.g. Lotto, Instant 
Lotteries, Entertainment machines) tend to have particularly high (and bigger than 
one) income elasticity measures in the long run: this means that gambling tax bases 
are expected to grow significantly more than income under a long run perspective; this 
phenomenon is particularly relevant for recently introduced games, rather than for 
Lotto which represents a more mature market. In particular instant lotteries revenues 
seem to be the most reactive to GDP variation, recording a particularly high 
coefficient. If we compare these estimates with the ones obtained on traditional tax 
bases (sales and income tax base) (Bruce et al., 2006) we see that gambling revenues 
tend to record much bigger income elasticity in the long run, suggesting to policy 
makers that these tax bases are expected to react impressively (and more the general 
sales and income tax bases) to change in GDP. This means that, in the long run, if the 
policy towards gambling promotion will not be modified, gambling will guarantee an 
increasing amount of tax revenues, becoming a more and more relevant category of 
state inflows. However, it is important to notice that, due to the huge increase in 
gambling supply during the last years, income elasticity estimates can be partially over-
estimated as some control variables (e.g. number of slot machines) are not still 
available. 
Results of short run estimates are less easy to interpret. When considering results 
of the symmetric model, generally short run estimates are lower than long run ones 
suggesting the presence of cautious and lagged responses of economic agents to 
income variation. Lotto revenues make exception as they record a significant and high 
short elasticity, meaning that Lotto revenues are the most volatile in the short run. On 
the other side, instant lotteries seem to be countercyclical, having a (slightly) 
significant negative income elasticity. This can be an important results: indeed, policy 
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maker struggling with problems of budget constraint can identify instant lotteries tax 
base at the same time as a long run ever-growing tax base and as a countercyclical 
instrument in the short run. Entertainment machines does not record significant 
elasticity coefficients, suggesting that this  gambling tax base is not highly reactive to 
variation in income in the short run. For what concerns adjustment to equilibrium, 
Lotto and Entertainment machines are the ones experiencing higher coefficients, and 
thus adjusting faster to the long run equilibrium. 
When allowing for an asymmetric response and adjustment depending on the 
position with respect to the long run equilibrium, results suggest that immediate 
responses to change in income tend to be higher when tax base is above long run 
equilibrium; Instant lotteries revenues experience a negative (but not significant) short 
run elasticity, suggesting the countercyclical nature of this type of game. Adjustments 
to long run equilibrium tend to be higher (but most of them not significant), in 
absolute values, for instant lotteries and entertainment machines tax base, suggesting 
that these gambling products adjust faster to the long run equilibrium. For what 
concerns Lotto revenues, the adjustment to equilibrium seem to be faster when the 
tax base is below long run equilibrium, that is in period of economic depression: this 
can be an useful indication for policy makers who struggle to refill state coffers during 
periods of financial downturn. However, most of the coefficients in asymmetric models 
turn out to be not significant, and thus the use of this model is not fully justified.  
Results of our models show that gambling tax base-revenues have some 
characteristics appreciated by policy makers: in particular they tend to grow in the long 
run adapting to GDP level; in addition instant lotteries revenues seem to move 
countercyclical to the business cycle in the short run. This may lead policy makers to 
incentivize gambling as a possible alternative source of revenue for the government. 
However,  this paper ignores ethical and moral issues: in particular the fact that, if we 
exclude casino, most of gamblers belong to the most economical disadvantaged 
categories of consumers, leading to a potential and highly discussed in the literature 
regressivity of this form of taxation (e.g. Clotfelter, 1979; Kitchen and Powells, 1991; 
Combs et al., 2008 Beckert and Lutter, 2009). In addition, pathological gambling has 
been officially recognised as a pathology already in 1980 by the American Psychiatric 
Association and it has been classified inside the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders: therefore the promotion of gambling is not devoid of social and 
economic costs (Walker and Barnett, 1999).  
The analysis proposed can be improved getting some additional datasets on 
gambling market: in particular, a sufficient long time series of data on real tax bases  
can be obtained on request from the Italian Customs and Monopolies Agency; this will 
permit us to use real data on gambling tax bases rather than proxies for tax bases. 
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Some additional data on gambling market (e.g. number of slots machines for each 
year) can also  help in the correct specification of the model. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Game Short Description 
Lotto Foresee a combination of numbers among 1 and 90. 
Superenalotto Foresee a combination of 6 numbers among 1 and 90. 
Lottery Buying instant (immediate extraction) or deferred (later extraction) lottery tickets. 
Sport Betting Foresee the outcome of sport events. 
Horse racing Foresee the outcome of horse races. 
Bingo Tombola based on the extraction among 90 numbers 
Slot Machines 
Entertainment machines where the aim is to match symbols  
on mechanical reels that spin and stop to reveal one or 
several symbols, Maximum bet for each game = 1euro; 
Maximum winning = 100 euro 
VideoLotteries 
Entertainment machines where the aim is to match symbols  
on mechanical reels that spin and stop to reveal one or 
several symbols Maximum bet for each game = 10euro; 
Maximum winning = 5.000 euro 
Skill Games Games in which ability is more relevant than luck (e.g. Bridge, poker, Chess) 
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